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Abstract. The article is a brief evaluation of the regulatory environment 
of language use in Transylvania, Romania based on Van Parijs’ conceptual 
toolkit presented in his 2011 book Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the 
World. This linguistic regime is a coercive hybrid regulation containing 
elements stemming from both the categorical regime (personality principle) 
and territoriality. In municipalities or counties where the offi cial use of 
minority languages is permitted, it is typically present in a conjunctive 
manner, but its enforcement is weak and inconsistent. The principle of 
territorially coercive linguistic subdivision – proposed by Van Parijs as 
an optimal solution for a greater linguistic justice – is not accommodated 
in any of the fi elds of offi cial communication and under present political 
circumstances it has no further plausibility. A hypothetical alternative for 
the territorially coercive regime would be the introduction of English as a 
lingua franca in interethnic communication. We argued that this latter option 
would be fair only if English could entirely replace the offi cial languages 
currently in use or it would receive a fully equivalent status at least in those 
regions where a considerable number of linguistic minorities live.
Keywords: multilingualism, language policies, Hungarians in Romania, 
English as a lingua franca
The Regulatory Context of Multilingualism in 
Transylvania
The demographic distribution of the nearly 1.3 million Hungarians in Transylvania, 
Romania shows a high regional disparity. One third of the Hungarians live 
in municipalities, where their proportion exceeds 80 percent, 54 percent is 
resident in settlements, where the Hungarians are in the majority, and every fi fth 
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Hungarian resides in a town or village where the Hungarians make up less than 
20 percent of the population. The not offi cially recognized Szeklerland is the only 
major historical-ethnographical region in Transylvania where Hungarians form a 
substantial majority; this area includes Harghita (Hargita), Covasna (Kovászna), 
and part of Mureş (Maros) counties and it is home to 38 percent of the Hungarian 
population in Romania.1
The regulatory environment of language use in Romania is without regard to 
this variability and the use of minority languages is controlled by country-wide 
uniform laws. In the terminology of Van Parijs, this regulatory regime has the 
following features:
– It is coercive rather than accommodating. There are specifi c laws concerning 
the use of language in different domains of public life; it is not determined by 
the mere utilitarian rationality of the actors or the neutrality of the market. The 
main element of this legislation is included in the Constitution, and it says that 
the Romanian is the only offi cial language of the country, which means that its 
use cannot be subjected to any restrictions and is compulsory in offi cial public 
communication. The treatment of minority languages in different domains is 
regulated by specifi c laws. The most important disposition in this respect is the 
law of local public administration, which came into force in 2001 and – even if it 
does not recognize them as equal offi cial languages – it does permit the (parallel) 
use of minority languages in those municipalities where the proportion of citizens 
belonging to the respective nationality exceeds 20 percent.
The legislation concerning education is more permissive since the threshold 
rule refers to absolute numbers: according to the law of education, in primary and 
lower secondary levels, it is permitted to operate a separate class in a minority 
language if the number of (the parents of) pupils who are asking for it exceeds 12.2
– The threshold rule in public administration creates a ‘hybrid’ regulation: the 
use of language becomes a personal right for the individual members of minorities: 
in this respect, it is a categorical regime; using the borders of an administrative 
unit for the threshold rule, however, introduces the territorial principle. The 
regulation concerning the language of education – since it is not linked to the 
proportion of minorities – is closer to a more permissive, categorical regime. 
The personality principle is endorsed in the healthcare system as well, which 
1 For a more detailed demographic description of the Hungarians in Transylvania, Romania, see 
Veres 2015. In Romania, the strongest determinant of Hungarian ethnic identity is the language, 
so the number of ethnic Hungarians and the number of native Hungarian speakers do not differ 
too much from each other. For further details, see: Kiss 2015. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, 
the ethnic and linguistic categories will be used alternately, depending on the context.
2 Another element of concession in the law permits the merger of up to 4 grade-groups into a 
single class – if transportation of pupils to the closest Hungarian school is not possible –, which 
makes minority language education with only three children of the same age possible. At higher 
school levels, this merger is not possible.
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means that patients have the right to receive information in their native language. 
However, the technical application of the law is often fraught with diffi culties 
because there are no regulations that would compel hospitals to hire staff who 
speak the languages of minorities. Finally, the personality principle should be 
applied in the courthouse as well: in a hearing – by request –, it is mandatory to 
provide interpreters for those who wish to communicate in their native language.
– The enforcement of the regulations concerning linguistic rights is weak. 
For example, despite the obligation to post bilingual signs in public institutions 
above the 20 percent threshold, this is effectively realized in only 81 percent of 
the local council buildings concerned, 23 percent of post offi ces, and only in 14 
percent of police stations (Horváth 2012, 188). There are many municipalities 
beyond the threshold where customer service in public institutions, hospitals, 
and courthouses is not functional in minority languages. Offi cials commonly 
explain the non-compliance with the law with the lack of fi nancial resources and 
disregard its implementation.
– The application of the administrative law is not consistent. In an exemplary 
case, the court considered discriminatory the imposition of the knowledge of 
minority language for the occupation of a public position, even though it was 
clearly required by the job description.3 This decision plainly ran counter to the 
provisions of the law.
– In municipalities or counties where the offi cial use of minority languages 
is permitted, it is typically present in a conjunctive manner. However, this is 
a limited conjunction as an important condition is not met, without which – 
according to Van Parijs – it can hardly be functional: for Romanians, it is not 
required to learn Hungarian, for Hungarians, however, it is part of their compulsory 
education to learn the language of the state. This is a major cause that contributes 
to the reproduction of status asymmetry between the ‘stronger’ Romanian and the 
‘weaker’ minority languages.
In education, there is a strengthening of a spontaneous disjunction: the 
proportion of those pupils who are studying in mixed-language schools is 
decreasing and there are more and more students enrolled in separated minority 
language schools.4
– The principle of territorially coercive linguistic subdivision is not 
accommodated in any of the fi elds; however, according to Van Parijs, this 
would be the only viable solution for the fair treatment of equity problems in a 
multilingual environment.
3 The case was about a competition for the post of director at the Covasna County library, in the 
respective county 74 percent of the population being Hungarian.
4 It is obvious, however, that since the mutual learning of each other’s’ language is not compulsory 
this also remains a limited disjunction.
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Democracy Defi cit in the Debate on Linguistic Justice
The latter proposal, however, is fi rmly rejected by the state authorities and the 
overwhelming majority of the Romanian politicians, and it does not appear in 
any of the programmes of the major political party of the Hungarian community 
in Romania. In its last ‘autonomy statute’ elaborated for Szeklerland (2013), 
RMDSZ5 – which alone has performed the political representation of Hungarians 
in Romania for almost 20 years – is promoting ‘mandatory bilingualism’, where 
the citizens of the region can choose which language they use in their offi cial 
communication. There is no mention about the compulsory learning of Hungarian 
for the Romanians, without which even the conjunctive bilingualism remains 
only a one-sided wish. The idea that the Hungarian language would be the sole 
medium of offi cial communication in Szeklerland was considered so unrealistic 
and offensive that it did not fi t into the prudent and consensus-seeking political 
strategy of RMDSZ, and it was never introduced in a public debate.
Thus – although many Hungarians in Transylvania live in an ethnically 
homogeneous, geographically compact region and continuously express their 
dissatisfaction with their linguistic rights –, the chances of adopting a law based 
on a territorially coercive linguistic subdivision is equal to zero. All signs indicate 
that Romanian democracy is not yet mature enough to host a meaningful public 
debate on this topic.6 Kymlicka and Grin wrote in 2003 that the arguments on 
linguistic justice in Eastern Europe are infl uenced mostly by irreconcilable values 
and ideologies, often times powered by nationalism (Kymlicka–Grin 2003)7. They 
are not thought through in economic terms and are not confi ned to technical 
aspects;8 they are intrinsically political in nature and remain normative. Under 
the pressure for fulfi lling the conditions for EU accession, the legal environment 
5 In English: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania.
6 A good indicator of how diffi cult it is to initiate a meaningful political debate on this issue is 
that in February 2015 a draft bill was submitted to the parliament that would have banned all 
kinds of civic or political initiatives – including discussion forums, demonstrations – organized 
around the topic of territorial autonomy. The initiative did not pass the parliament.
7 The most frequent counter-argument against the autonomy aspirations of the Hungarians – 
beyond the reference to the 1st article of the Romanian Constitution that ‘Romania is a sovereign, 
independent, unitary, and indivisible Nation-State’ – is the allusion to the ‘right of the soil’, 
which, according to Van Parijs is ‘(pre)historical speculation on who was fi rst to tread on a 
particular bit of soil, on who can claim the territory as their ancestral land’. For a functional 
territorial regime – which ‘is able to do what it needs to do for the sake of parity of esteem’ – he 
proposes ‘to give a privilege to the ‘sons of the soil’, in the precise sense of those residing in the 
territory concerned at the time the regime is put into place’ (Van Parijs 2011, 138). According to 
the defi nition, in the case of Szeklerland, the ‘sons of the soil’ would be the resident Hungarians.
8 One of the most obvious economic arguments against the present regime would be that 
Hungarian education for the Romanians in Szeklerland would be less costly than the teaching 
of Romanian for the Hungarians who are in the majority in this region. This option, however, 
due to the cited arguments, is not realistic at all.
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has considerably improved – for example, the law on the use of languages in 
public administration entered into force; the mainstream narratives of the 
majority related to linguistic justice, however, remained almost unchanged.9
The Consequences of Asymmetric Bilingualism
A fairly superfi cial, poorly elaborated, and not properly enforced regulation 
contributes to the subsistence of an asymmetrical bilingualism in Transylvania, 
where minorities are those who always have to do the linguistic ‘bowing’, 
jeopardizing the chances to secure a parity of esteem in interethnic relations. Such 
a regulation can at most slow down the linguistic assimilation of minorities, but 
it is hardly going to stop it. Under these conditions, along with probability-driven 
learning, maxi-min dynamics, Laponce’s law, interlinguism etc., it is a highly 
probable prognosis that the number of Hungarian speakers in Transylvania will 
continue to decrease.
Besides the long-term consequences, however, the inequalities articulated 
along Van Parijs’ dimensions of justice and originating in language disadvantages 
are clearly palpable even today. There is no room for their detailed discussion 
here, so we will highlight only one empirically well-documented example.
Surveys carried out among Transylvanian Hungarians show that – all other 
things being equal – those with a higher profi ciency in Romanian have higher 
salaries. Income inequalities stemming from differences in the knowledge of 
Romanian could be legitimate if language learning solely depended on individual 
ambitions and efforts: it would be a fair expectation that a better knowledge of 
Romanian gained with a greater effort, as a human capital investment, would 
produce higher returns. But the circumstances of linguistic exposure are quite 
different, and they vary considerably from region to region: In Szeklerland, 
where the Hungarians are in majority, the exposure is low, the immersion 
method does not work, the teaching of Romanian is highly ineffi cient because 
it has to follow a programme created for native speakers, which is imposed by 
the ministry of education and in which they use outdated didactic methods 
relying almost exclusively on textbooks. It is true that the teaching of Romanian 
is funded by public sources (and thus every language group contributes to it 
in proportion to their presence), but there are no resources assigned and 
programmes created, however, to compensate this type of drawback. This creates 
an involuntary disadvantage for those Hungarians who are living with their 
9 The stance of the Romanian public opinion towards minority language rights is well expressed 
by the fact that only 18.2 percent of the Romanian population agreed that the Hungarians should 
have the right to use their native language in their communication with local authorities (Kiss 
2015, 43).
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co-ethnics in homogeneous communities. Although empirically not tested yet, 
following this logic of argument, it is highly probable that part of the earning 
inequalities between the Romanians and Hungarians is explained by the differing 
competencies in Romanian.
So, the present linguistic arrangement in Transylvania has many shortcomings 
and it is a constant latent source of tension in the region; it not only creates 
inequalities but also challenges (interethnic) social solidarity and it is not 
benefi cial for the aggregate welfare of the society either. Van Parijs’s book proposes 
as a solution the enforcement of a territorially coercive regime and the use of a 
single offi cial language spoken by the great majority of the locals (in Szeklerland 
that would be Hungarian). He does not raise, however, a very important question: 
what happens when the linguistic inequality is present, but the territorially 
coercive principle – as the only viable proposal to eliminate the equity problem 
– simply cannot be introduced and enforced because of a democracy defi cit? 
Does the territorially coercive linguistic subdivision principle have a viable 
and feasible alternative, which, on the one hand, meets the criterion of fairness 
(would solve the equity problem) and, on the other, would it be acceptable for the 
speakers of the ‘stronger language’, the majority Romanians?
Possibilities of the Use of English as a Lingua Franca in 
an Interethnic Environment
Van Parijs’ book 1) contains detailed arguments about the need for the introduction 
of English as a global lingua franca as a tool to achieve greater global distributive 
justice, 2) for the illustration of language policy solutions in response to linguistic 
injustice, it brings up examples that straighten out the asymmetry between 
minority and majority languages in a nation-state context (Quebec, Switzerland, 
Catalonia, etc.). The book – although it follows from the logic of arguments – 
does not make connection between these two topics: it does not come up with 
the possibility that English could function as a lingua franca in interethnic 
communication within the same country.10 If English is recommended anyway 
for a greater global distributive justice, why could it not be the offi cial language 
of communication between different nationalities within the same country? A 
positive latent effect or by-product of the externality of English as a lingua franca 
is that it would solve most of the equity problems encountered in language use 
between different nationalities.
Furthermore, there are also compelling arguments that in linguistically 
heterogeneous societies the use of a third language as a lingua franca – in 
10 He is refl ecting briefl y on the question, but only in the case of immigrant minorities.
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addition, and corollary to ensuring fairness – contributes to an increase in trust 
and altruism among the communities, and to the general growth of social capital 
(Liu 2015). And where there is trust, the transaction costs are lower, which, 
in turn, will increase the competitiveness of the local economy. Similarly: 
since with the use of a lingua franca the linguistic barriers to conduct global 
business would be reduced, transactions would become more effi cient. This is 
an important and relevant aspect of the situation in Transylvania as well, where 
interethnic distrust is high, and an ethnicity-based segmentation of the markets 
is also palpable (Csata–Deák 2010).
So, the use of English as a lingua franca as a power-neutralizing language 
regime could get important economic functions at two levels: it could increase 
the volume and the effectiveness of the transactions between different language 
groups and enhance a more equitable global integration of the national economy, 
reducing its distance from the ‘ground-fl oor’ countries. Obviously, the aggregate 
welfare benefi ts of the use of English as a lingua franca are hypothetical and 
diffi cult to estimate, their discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
Beyond the equity and welfare aspects, the idea has several procedural 
advantages, too. First, along the detailed arguments presented in the book, it is more 
plausible that the majority decision-makers will start to discuss this possibility 
and make proposals for its broader social dissemination and programmatic 
elaboration. In the case of territorially coercive linguistic subdivision – as we 
mentioned earlier –, there is practically no chance for this. Although we do not 
have any survey data to confi rm this, broader public support for the introduction 
of English as a lingua franca would be probably higher.
Second, in terms of minority language protection principles, it would solve 
the seemingly intractable problem of applying the territoriality or the personality 
(categorical) principle in regulation. The problem with the existing hybrid 
solutions (e.g. the threshold rule) and proposals (e.g. the autonomy statute of 
RMDSZ)11 is not only that they are inconclusive/incomplete, and thus their 
introduction in legislation and their enforcement would encounter a lot of 
diffi culties, but also that they lead to suboptimal results concerning the protection 
of minority rights.
In those municipalities and counties where the proportion of the minorities 
does not reach 20 percent, the protection of languages is, at best, limited to 
educational and cultural institutions.12 Where the proportion of the minorities 
is higher, the situation is somewhat more favourable, but the arguments of the 
book are quite convincing that within the framework of asymmetric bilingualism 
due to the absence of a territorially coercive regime the ‘weaker’, lower status 
11 RMDSZ calls for a territorial autonomy for Szeklerland and for a personality-based cultural 
autonomy for the rest of the Transylvanian Hungarians.
12 In the political terminology of RMDSZ, this is called ‘cultural autonomy’.
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language will be used by fewer and fewer people, and sooner or later they are 
prone to disappear. The introduction of the offi cial use of English, as a third 
language, however, would eliminate the asymmetry of the linguistic rights based 
on the personality principle, while the threat of majority language dominance 
would ensure parity of esteem in everyday interactions (equal opportunity and 
profi ciency, equality of symbolism).
Thirdly, the personality-based linguistic equity would favour those linguistic 
minorities as well who usually live in municipalities where their proportion is 
less than 20 percent (Roma, Germans, etc.).13
The introduction of English as an offi cial language in Transylvania will obviously 
raise many further questions to be resolved. First of all, it is costly and a series of 
arguments warns us that it could endanger the development and survival of local 
and regional languages (Phillipson 2010). These global concerns are discussed in 
detail in Van Parijs’ book, so we do not deal with them here because they affect 
everyone equally, regardless if they belong to a linguistic minority or majority 
in a specifi c country. We must agree with Van Parijs, however, that if there is a 
need for a lingua franca to get closer to a global distributive justice, English is the 
most accessible and effi cient solution. We see that the use of English in everyday 
interactions is a rapidly spreading practice in Transylvania as well, especially at 
multinational companies and in intellectual professions. The fact that more and 
more people are getting familiar with the everyday use of English can further 
accelerate this process and it can show up in other areas as well.
English as an Offi cial Language
Concerning the specifi c aspects of ELF related to linguistic minorities, we argue 
that the introduction of English as a lingua franca could eliminate the inequalities 
caused by asymmetric bilingualism only if it could entirely replace the offi cial 
languages currently in use or if it received a fully equivalent status at least in those 
regions where a considerable number of people belong to linguistic minorities. In 
the case of Transylvania, this would mean that instead of Romanian minorities 
could use English in public administration, healthcare, court proceedings, etc. 
and the knowledge of Romanian would not be necessary to succeed.
The introduction of English as a lingua franca – along with Romanian as 
another compulsory offi cial language in the country – does not necessarily solve 
the unequal opportunity problem mentioned above. For example, if, in addition 
to English, the Hungarian children would have to continue to learn Romanian as 
13 Because of the limitations of this paper, we did not deal with the other linguistic minorities 
in Transylvania (Roma, Germans, etc.), but most of the problems relevant for the Hungarian 
minority apply to them as well.
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well in order to succeed in life, the asymmetrical relation will persist since the 
Hungarian children will still need to learn one more language compared with the 
Romanians. Even if we assume that after learning a second language it is easier to 
learn a third one, the aggregate efforts of Hungarians to get along with interethnic 
communication will be higher than those of the Romanians. In other words: if 
the Hungarian and Romanian children spend the same amount of time learning 
other languages as their mother tongue, Romanian children will probably speak 
English better because in the case of Hungarians part of this time should be spent 
learning Romanian. This is an alternative cost which should be borne only by 
Hungarian pupils.
Studies on foreign language skills among the youth in Romania support this 
hypothesis: Hungarian-Romanian bilingual high-school students underperform 
in English tests compared with monolingual Romanians (Iatcu 2005, Molnár 
2008). In relation to this, however, a number of alternative explanations must 
be taken into account. One of them is that it is easier for a Romanian pupil to 
learn English because Romanian closely resembles English. But both studies 
revealed that Romanian children even knew signifi cantly more English words 
that do not resemble their Romanian equivalents (non-cognate words). A further 
alternative explanation is that in Romanian schools/classes the quality of foreign 
language education could be higher. Finally, slight differences could exist in 
the exposure to English.14 These latter two hypotheses, therefore, need to be 
verifi ed. Nevertheless, in all of these assumptions, the initial one appears to be 
the strongest, that is the English language skills of Hungarian students are poorer 
than those of Romanians because they have to learn two foreign languages instead 
of one and they spend time learning Romanian at the expense of English. Their 
disadvantage could only be partially compensated by the fact that due to the 
early compulsory learning of Romanian their meta-linguistic competencies could 
be more developed, thanks to which it might be easier to learn a third language 
(in this case, English).
Further analysis shows that this disadvantage is not evened out after studies 
either. According to the Mozaik 2001 survey data, among those Hungarian 
youngsters who live in central and western Transylvania and who have started 
to work, only 21.8 percent declared that they spoke English compared with 26.1 
percent registered among the Transylvanian Romanians. Among the Hungarians 
in Eastern Transylvania – Szeklerland –, this ratio was even lower, only 7 percent.
14 For the exposure, we should consider the important example given by Van Parijs in the book 
(2011). He argues that it is much easier to learn English if, instead of dubbing, fi lms were 
featured in their original language and were subtitled in the language of the country/region. 
In Romania, subtitles are generally used, while in Hungary dubbing is the common practice, 
and for a Hungarian native speaker in Romania it is obviously more comfortable to choose 
Hungarian dubbing instead of the original sound track and Romanian subtitles, which are both 
more diffi cult to understand.
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According to the 2009 Ethnobarometer survey on an adult sample, 36 percent of 
the Romanians and only 22 percent of the Hungarians considered that their English 
was good enough to participate in a conversation.15 As a conclusion, we can state 
that as long as the Romanian language will continue to be a compulsory subject 
to learn for the minorities the introduction of English as a lingua franca would 
probably not solve the equity problem caused by the asymmetrical bilingualism 
since it seems that the Hungarians accumulate a further disadvantage compared 
with the Romanians regarding their foreign language skills. The situation would 
radically change, however, if Romanian would be permitted and promoted to 
be completely replaced by English in interethnic communication. This option – 
although it might sound absurd in this part of the world – is already in practice 
in some countries and brings us closer to linguistic equality.16
Conclusions
Using Van Parijs’ conceptual toolkit, we have carried out a brief evaluation of 
the regulatory environment of language use in Transylvania, Romania. We 
identifi ed it as a coercive hybrid regulation containing elements stemming from 
both the categorical regime (personality principle) and territoriality. In Romania, 
the enforcement of the regulations concerning linguistic rights is weak and 
inconsistent. In municipalities or counties where the offi cial use of minority 
languages is permitted, it is typically present in a conjunctive manner. The 
principle of territorially coercive linguistic subdivision – proposed by Van Parijs 
as an optimal solution for linguistic justice – is not accommodated in any of the 
fi elds of offi cial communication and it has no further plausibility under present 
political circumstances.
A hypothetical alternative for the territorially coercive regime would be the 
introduction of English as a lingua franca in interethnic communication. This 
possibility has two obvious advantages: according to Van Parijs, this would bring 
the whole society closer to a global distributive equality, but on a local level it 
would eliminate the unhealthy asymmetry between the ‘stronger’ majority and 
‘weaker’ minority languages and the inequalities stemming from that. We argued 
that this latter option would be fair only if English could entirely replace the offi cial 
languages currently in use or if it received a fully equivalent status at least in those 
regions where linguistic minorities comprise a considerable number of people.
15 The estimated level of profi ciency was higher among Romanians in all other foreign languages 
as well. The only exception was German, where the differences were not signifi cant (10 percent 
of the population declared that they could make themselves understood in German).
16 Related to this solution, the positive example of Singapore is cited frequently, where the 
Chinese, Malay, and Indian populations communicate with each other in English. For details, 
see: Liu 2015.
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